朝鲜战争在战争史上的意义

In spite of its limited nature, the Korean War was tremendously destructive. Korea’s industrial base was wiped out.
尽管朝鲜战争的性质有限,但它极具破坏性。韩国的工业基础被摧毁了。

The Korean peninsula was divided along the line of contact at the end of the war and remains so to this day. A political conference called for in the armistice agreement was held in Geneva in 1954, but the two sides’ demands were too far apart to permit any compromise. The peninsula became a microcosm of the Cold War itself. Heavily armed, North and South Korea faced each other across the demilitarized zone. But, other than desultory skirmishing, a second war has not broken out.
朝鲜半岛在战争结束时沿着接触线分裂,直到今天仍然如此。停战协定要求的政治会议于1954年在日内瓦举行,但双方的要求相距甚远,不容妥协。朝鲜半岛成了冷战本身的缩影。全副武装的朝鲜和韩国在非军事区对面对峙。但是,除了零星的冲突,第二次战争并没有爆发。

South Korea emerged from the war militarily secure but domestically unstable. The ROK armed forces had grown to number 600,000 men. They could hold their own against the North Koreans and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese. Following his unilateral release of North Korean POWs, Rhee had secured from the USA a mutual defense treaty, long-term economic aid, and assistance in expanding the ROK armed forces. Additionally, the Eighth Army remained in South Korea throughout the Cold War. The ROK was now an important bulwark against Communist expansionism in east Asia. It would be one of the few nations to provide a sizable military contribution to the American war effort in Vietnam. However, South Korea would not experience substantial economic growth until the 1960s. The constant threat of war led Rhee toward greater authoritarianism and high levels of military spending, which detracted from economic development. The political context of South Korea was marked by authoritarian governments and intermittent student protests. Rhee himself was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1961.
韩国从战争中崛起,军事安全,但国内不稳定。韩国武装力量已经发展到60万人。他们可以坚持自己的立场,反对朝鲜,在较小程度上反对中国。在单方面释放朝鲜战俘后,李瑞环已经从美国获得了一项共同防御条约、长期经济援助和扩大韩国武装力量的援助。此外,第八军在整个冷战期间一直留在韩国。韩国现在是抵御共产主义在东亚扩张的重要堡垒。这将是为数不多的几个为美国在越南的战争提供可观军事贡献的国家之一。然而,韩国直到20世纪60年代才会经历实质性的经济增长。不断的战争威胁导致李承晚走向更大的独裁主义和高水平的军费开支,这不利于经济发展。韩国的政治环境以独裁政府和断断续续的学生抗议为标志。他本人在1961年的政变中被推翻。

North Korea remained a potent military power after the war. Close ties were maintained with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Indeed, North Korea became intensely-Communist. The re-indoctrination of Communism was necessary to mobilize sufficient resources for economic reconstruction. The effort was largely successful, and the North Korean economy was rebuilt by the late 1950s. Politically, the defeats of the Korean War undercut Kim Il Sung’s leadership position. In order to stay in power, he executed a number of his opponents. He then built a cult of personality around the myth that North Korea had won the Korean War. Kim ultimately survived the Cold War, and North Korea remains a Communist state to this day under his son’s leadership.
战后,朝鲜仍然是一个强大的军事强国。与苏联和中国保持着密切的关系。事实上,朝鲜变得非常共产主义。共产主义的再灌输对于调动足够的资源进行经济重建是必要的。这项努力基本上是成功的,朝鲜经济在20世纪50年代末得以重建。在政治上,朝鲜战争的失败削弱了金日成的领导地位。为了继续掌权,他处决了许多对手。然后,他围绕朝鲜赢得朝鲜战争的神话建立了个人崇拜。金正日最终熬过了冷战,直到今天,在他儿子的领导下,朝鲜仍然是一个共产主义国家。

The Korean War is often considered a draw or even a defeat for the UNC. The Soviet Union and the PRC had achieved their minimal goal of defending their positions in east Asia. The two countries remained powerful obstacles to American hegemony in the area. The independence of North Korea had been preserved. However, this reasoning assumes that the lack of total victory was a defeat. In fact, the Korean War was an unmistakable victory for the UNC.
朝鲜战争通常被认为是联合国军司令部的平局甚至失败。苏联和中华人民共和国已经实现了捍卫其在东亚地位的最低目标。这两个国家仍然是美国在该地区霸权的强大障碍。朝鲜的独立得到了维护。然而,这种推理假设没有完全胜利就是失败。事实上,朝鲜战争对联合国军司令部来说是一个明确无误的胜利。

First, the important UNC demands were met in negotiations. Concessions were only made on minor points. The line of contact, not the 38th Parallel, became the border between North and South Korea, and voluntary repatriation was enforced. Second, in the course of military operations, the Communists suffered far greater manpower and economic losses than the UNC. For the PRC and North Korea, the opportunity cost of these lost resources for internal development was great. Third, the West halted the first major Communist attempt at overt aggression. Without delving into a counterfactual, it is reasonable to assume that if South Korea had not been successfully defended, China and the Soviet Union would have continued with a more overtly aggressive foreign policy against the West. Instead, for the remainder of the Cold War, they resorted to guerrilla warfare as the primary means of expanding their influence. There were no truly decisive battles in the Korean War. Success for the Communists or the UNC ultimately depended on their ability to sustain protracted warfare through a combination of economic strength and military efficiency. The Communists proved less able to do so. Despite their numerical superiority, the Communists needed to break the military ascendancy of the UNC before the weakness of their economic systems made continued warfare unacceptably expensive. Instead, the clumsy Communist tactics in the first year of the war and Ridgway’s generalship crippled their war effort. Deng Hua and Yang Dezhi did a remarkable job reforming the CPV in 1952. But by the time these reforms took effect, the Chinese could no longer shoulder the costs of war.
首先,谈判满足了联合国军司令部的重要要求。只在次要问题上做出了让步。接触线,而不是三八线,成为朝鲜和韩国之间的边界,并强制执行自愿遣返。第二,在军事行动过程中,共产党遭受的人力和经济损失比联合国军司令部大得多。对中国和朝鲜来说,这些失去的内部发展资源的机会成本是巨大的。第三,西方阻止了共产党首次公开侵略的重大企图。不探究反事实,我们有理由假设,如果韩国没有成功防御,中国和苏联会继续对西方采取更加公开的侵略性外交政策。相反,在冷战的剩余时间里,他们把游击战作为扩大影响力的主要手段。朝鲜战争中没有真正决定性的战斗。共产党或联合国军司令部的成功最终取决于他们通过经济实力和军事效率相结合来维持长期战争的能力。事实证明,共产党不太可能做到这一点。尽管共产主义者在数量上占优势,但他们需要在经济体系疲软导致持续战争代价高得令人无法接受之前,打破联合国军司令部的军事优势。相反,战争第一年笨拙的共产主义策略和李奇伟的将军地位削弱了他们的战争努力。邓华和杨德志在1952年对CPV进行了卓越的改革。但是当这些改革生效的时候,中国人已经不能再承担战争的代价了。

After overcoming the initial Chinese intervention, the UNC became an exceptionally efficient military force. The UNC mounted offensives without sustaining heavy casualties; repeatedly halted Communist attacks; conducted air strikes throughout North Korea; and controlled the seas surrounding the peninsula. Technological superiority, abundance of firepower, a core of experienced soldiers, and innovating commanders engendered military efficiency. Moreover, the economic strength of the USA meant that the UNC could fight the war virtually indefinitely. China’s economy, on the other hand, had never recovered from the Chinese Civil War or the Second World War. As the Korean War dragged on, the need for internal economic development and an end to the burden of military expenditure created an impetus for compromise. For the Soviet Union, the heavy costs of financing and supplying a major regional war were not worth the marginal reward of enforcing the Communist bargaining position in negotiations. Hence, by 1953, the Communists preferred to compromise rather than overburden their economies with an interminable war.
在克服了中国最初的干预后,联合国军司令部成为了一支异常高效的军事力量。联合国军司令部发动攻势,但没有造成重大伤亡;一再停止共产主义攻击;在朝鲜全境进行空袭;控制了半岛周围的海洋。技术优势、丰富的火力、有经验士兵的核心以及创新的指挥官造就了军事效率。此外,美国的经济实力意味着联合国军司令部几乎可以无限期作战。另一方面,中国经济从未从中国内战或第二次世界大战中复苏。随着朝鲜战争的继续,国内经济发展的需要和军事开支负担的结束为妥协创造了动力。对苏联来说,为一场主要的地区战争融资和供应的沉重成本,不值得在谈判中加强共产主义谈判地位的边际回报。因此,到了1953年,共产党人更愿意妥协,而不是用一场无休止的战争使他们的经济负担过重。

The Korean War had wide implications for the entire international system. First, as technically a United Nations action, the Korean War was pivotal in the development of that organization. Second, in the area of military strategy, Korea was significant as the first limited war. Hard practical experience in the Korean War had raised major questions regarding the usability of nuclear weapons. Third, and most importantly, the war affected the balance of power between the two superpowers.
朝鲜战争对整个国际体系有着广泛的影响。首先,从技术上讲,朝鲜战争是联合国的一项行动,对该组织的发展至关重要。第二,在军事战略领域,朝鲜作为第一次有限战争意义重大。朝鲜战争中艰难的实践经验引发了关于核武器可用性的重大问题。第三,也是最重要的一点,战争影响了两个超级大国之间的力量平衡。

It was in Korea that the UN first authorized the use of force in the name of collective security. Unfortunately, the Korean War showed that, in reality, the UN was not a guarantor of collective security. UN action was a fluke resulting from Soviet absence in the Security Council. The UN was not acting out the will of the entire international community, but that of the West. Later in the Cold War, UN action in support of collective security was usually impossible because of opposition from either the USA or the Soviet Union, depending on whose sphere of influence the UN was considering intervening in. Nevertheless, several important diplomatic initiatives originated in the UN, including the first cease-fire resolution in December 1950 and Jacob Malik’s proposal for negotiations in June 1951. The ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure was also created in the Korean War. It would be used again in the Cold War, most notably as a means for the USA to punish the British and French during the Suez Canal Crisis. Most importantly, the fact that the Korean War was heavily debated in the UN by all member states validated the UN’s role as the legitimate mediator of international conflicts and a forum for diplomacy.
正是在朝鲜,联合国首次授权以集体安全的名义使用武力。不幸的是,朝鲜战争表明,事实上,联合国不是集体安全的保障者。联合国的行动是苏联缺席安理会的侥幸结果。联合国不是在执行整个国际社会的意愿,而是西方的意愿。冷战后期,由于美国或苏联的反对,联合国支持集体安全的行动通常是不可能的,这取决于联合国考虑干预谁的势力范围。然而,几项重要的外交倡议起源于联合国,包括1950年12月的第一项停火决议和1951年6月雅各布·马利克提出的谈判建议。“团结谋和平”程序也是在朝鲜战争中创立的。它将在冷战中再次被使用,最显著的是作为美国在苏伊士运河危机中惩罚英法的一种手段。最重要的是,朝鲜战争在联合国引起了所有会员国的激烈辩论,这一事实证明了联合国作为国际冲突的合法调解人和外交论坛的作用。

Regarding military strategy, the Korean War was the first illustration of the new context of warfare that emerged in the Cold War. The former aim of warfare, the total annihilation of an opponent, was excessively dangerous. The dramatic victories of the North Korean blitzkrieg, the Inchon landing, and the Second Phase Offensive caused a rapid escalation of the Korean War that brought each combatant to the brink of world war. A limited aim was now the goal of most wars. In Korea, and frequently thereafter, a limited aim embodied seeking minor political gains through a negotiated resolution of the war. Military operations were carefully restrained in order to reduce the risk of escalation. Similar restrictions on military operations would reappear in subsequent wars, such as Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Indo-Pakistani Wars. The methods of warfare implemented under these restrictions in the Korean War – attrition, air power, and nuclear threats – were the first adaptations to limited war. Consequently, the Korean War was the formative experience in the strategic thought and operational doctrines developed during the Cold War.
关于军事战略,朝鲜战争是冷战中出现的新战争背景的第一个例证。战争的前一个目标,彻底消灭对手,是非常危险的。朝鲜闪电战、仁川登陆和第二阶段进攻的戏剧性胜利导致朝鲜战争的迅速升级,将每一个战斗人员都带到了世界大战的边缘。现在大多数战争的目标都是有限的。在韩国,以及此后经常出现的情况是,一个有限的目标体现为通过谈判解决战争来寻求微小的政治利益。军事行动受到谨慎限制,以降低升级的风险。对军事行动的类似限制将在随后的战争中重现,如越南战争、阿以战争和印巴战争。朝鲜战争中在这些限制下实施的战争方法——消耗、空中力量和核威胁——是对有限战争的第一次适应。因此,朝鲜战争是冷战期间发展起来的战略思想和作战理论的形成经验。

Attrition was the first method of warfare that the UNC applied to fighting a limited war. Ridgway found that gradual and careful attrition could defeat the Communists on the battlefield and enforce the UNC bargaining position yet not escalate the conflict. The significance of attrition was underlined when Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua adopted it as the operational doctrine of the CPV. However, because of its protracted nature, attrition on the ground entailed a steady flow of casualties for both the UNC and the Communists. Indeed, after 1953, the Eisenhower administration forswore the use of conventional force largely because of the costs of attrition in Korea. Nevertheless, attrition would be applied as a strategy in many later conflicts in the Cold War – not always successfully – such as Vietnam, the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, and the Iran-Iraq War.
消耗战是联合国军司令部用于打有限战争的第一种作战方法。李奇威发现,渐进而谨慎的减员可以在战场上击败共产党,并加强联合国军司令部的谈判地位,但不会使冲突升级。彭怀德、邓华将减员作为CPV的作战原则,凸显了减员的重要性。然而,由于其旷日持久的性质,实地的减员给联合国军司令部和共产党带来了持续不断的伤亡。事实上,1953年后,艾森豪威尔政府放弃使用常规武力,主要是因为朝鲜的减员成本。然而,消耗战将作为一种战略应用于冷战后的许多冲突——并不总是成功的——比如越南战争、埃及-以色列消耗战和两伊战争。

The use of air power was less effective as a means of fighting a limited war. It could not inflict the damage necessary to make the Communists crack. Nevertheless, it remained a preferred, if often overrated, means of applying force after Korea. In the US air force, the perceived success of the air campaign was used to confirm the decisiveness of air power in modern warfare. Strategic air campaigns that were very similar to Operation Strangle and the sustained air pressure strategy were implemented in Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1999 conflict in Kosovo. Although rarely decisive, the allure of a painless and quick victory makes air power the West’s principal means of waging war to this day.
使用空中力量作为打有限战争的手段效率较低。它不能造成使共产党崩溃所必需的损害。尽管如此,它仍然是继朝鲜之后的首选武力手段,尽管经常被高估。在美国空军,空战的明显成功被用来证实空军在现代战争中的决定性。在越南、1991年海湾战争和1999年科索沃冲突中,实施了与“勒死行动”和持续气压战略非常相似的战略空袭。尽管很少具有决定性,但无痛快速胜利的诱惑力使得空军成为西方迄今发动战争的主要手段。

Eisenhower’s nuclear threats represented the final new method of warfare implemented in Korea. As noted above, while the nuclear threats signalled that the USA was resolved to fight a heightened war if necessary, they probably had only a marginal effect on the Communist decision to compromise. Historically, the nuclear threats were a part of the development of deterrence strategy, which dominated strategic discourse in the Cold War. In 1954, Eisenhower and Dulles instituted the New Look doctrine, hoping to repeat the supposed success of their nuclear threats at the end of the Korean War. The New Look threatened that Communist aggression anywhere in the world would be the subject of a devastating American nuclear strike. It was believed that this threat of massive retaliation would deter future Communist expansionism. Although massive retaliation was eventually discredited, nuclear threats, as a component of deterrence, were used again in international crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
艾森豪威尔的核威胁代表了朝鲜实施的最后一种新的战争方法。如上所述,尽管核威胁表明美国决心在必要时打一场激烈的战争,但它们对共产党妥协的决定可能只有很小的影响。从历史上看,核威胁是威慑战略发展的一部分,威慑战略在冷战时期主导着战略话语。1954年,艾森豪威尔和杜勒斯创立了新面貌理论,希望在朝鲜战争结束时重复他们核威胁的假定成功。《新面貌》威胁说,共产主义在世界任何地方的侵略都将成为美国毁灭性核打击的目标。人们相信,这种大规模报复的威胁将阻止未来的共产主义扩张主义。尽管大规模报复最终被证明是不可信的,但核威胁作为威慑的一个组成部分,在古巴导弹危机和1973年赎罪日战争等国际危机中再次被使用。

In terms of the balance of power, the Korean War motivated the Western powers to view Communism as an imminent threat to their security and take a more determined stance against its expansion. The USA mobilized meaningfully to enforce containment throughout the world. As the Soviet Union strove to match this impressive military build-up, Western rearmament set the tone for the arms races that marked the remainder of the Cold War. The size of the American armed forces multiplied. Massive programs for new ships, missiles, tanks, and aircraft were implemented. In Europe, England and France also increased the size of their armed forces. NATO was greatly strengthened through the establishment of unified command with strong military forces under its authority. Moreover, the impetus had been created to rearm West Germany as a part of NATO, which would actually occur in 1950s.
就力量平衡而言,朝鲜战争促使西方列强将共产主义视为对其安全的迫在眉睫的威胁,并对其扩张采取更坚定的立场。美国有意义地动员起来,在全世界实施遏制。随着苏联努力与这一令人印象深刻的军事集结相匹配,西方重整军备为标志着冷战剩余时间的军备竞赛定下了基调。美国武装力量的规模成倍增长。新船只、导弹、坦克和飞机的大规模计划已经实施。在欧洲,英国和法国也增加了他们的武装力量。北约通过建立由强大军事力量领导的统一指挥得到了极大的加强。此外,重新武装西德成为北约的一部分的动力已经产生,这实际上发生在20世纪50年代。

Outside Europe, the USA ceased neglecting east Asia in its geostrategic planning. The Japan-US Security Treaty facilitated the long-term stationing of formidable American air, ground, and naval forces in Japan. Additionally, increased American military spending in Japan during the Korean War helped it on the path to economic recovery. With its relatively secure island status, large population, and growing economy, Japan became the centrepiece of American security architecture in East Asia.
在欧洲之外,美国不再忽视东亚的地缘战略规划。日美安全条约促进了强大的美国空军、陆军和海军在日本的长期驻扎。此外,朝鲜战争期间美国在日本增加军事开支帮助日本走上了经济复苏的道路。凭借其相对安全的岛屿地位、庞大的人口和不断增长的经济,日本成为美国在东亚安全架构的核心。

The USA also took greater interest in the defense of Taiwan. In the Taiwan offshore islands crises of 1954-55 and 1958, the USA appeared willing to defend Nationalist territory against Communist encroachment. But the Korean War also caused the USA to embrace global containment and the precepts of NSC 68 too tightly. In Indochina, the USA was paying for 80 percent of France’s military operations by 1954. With the losses of Korea fresh in mind, Eisenhower would not send military forces to fight the Viet Minh, nor would he agree to use nuclear weapons to save the French at Dien Ben Phu. Later administrations were less cautious and believed that the ultimate success of the Korean War in halting Communism meant that the USA would also be successful in a war in Vietnam.
美国也对台湾的防御更感兴趣。在1954-1955年和1958年的台湾近海岛屿危机中,美国似乎愿意保卫民族主义领土不受共产党侵犯。但是朝鲜战争也导致美国过于严格地接受全球遏制和NSC 68的规则。到1954年,在印度支那,美国支付了法国80%的军事行动费用。考虑到朝鲜的损失,艾森豪威尔不会派遣军队与越南作战,也不会同意使用核武器在迪恩本富拯救法国。后来的政府不那么谨慎,认为朝鲜战争在阻止共产主义方面的最终成功意味着美国也将在越南战争中获得成功。

The growth of American power in east Asia was inhibited by the emergence of the PRC as a military power in the region. The world now viewed the PRC as a major Communist military power and not a backward agricultural state. The Chinese military had proven that they could contend with the best forces of the West. The catastrophic defeat of the US Eighth Army in November and December 1950 showed that liberating Communist countries could be excessively dangerous. After the defeat, the USA never again tried to liberate a Communist state by invasion. For example, in the Vietnam War, the USA would not invade North Vietnam for fear of Chinese intervention. The PRC enjoyed increased influence in east Asia and the Third World. Its veteran officers became advisors in numerous national liberation movements, particularly in Vietnam. Mistakenly, the USA predominantly treated China as the unswerving and unpredictably dangerous ally of the Soviet Union. In fact, the PRC was denied entry into the UN until Nixon’s presidency.
中华人民共和国成为东亚地区的军事强国,抑制了美国在东亚的力量增长。世界现在把中国视为一个主要的共产主义军事力量,而不是一个落后的农业国家。中国军方已经证明,他们能够与西方最强大的力量抗衡。1950年11月和12月美国第八军的灾难性失败表明,解放共产主义国家可能过于危险。战败后,美国再也没有试图通过入侵解放一个共产主义国家。例如,在越南战争中,美国不会入侵北越,因为害怕中国的干预。中华人民共和国在东亚和第三世界享有越来越大的影响力。其资深军官成为许多民族解放运动的顾问,特别是在越南。美国错误地将中国视为苏联坚定不移、不可预测的危险盟友。事实上,在尼克松任总统之前,中国一直被拒绝加入联合国。

The Korean War also had implications for China’s relationship with the Soviet Union. In the short term, fighting the USA reinforced the Sino-Soviet Alliance. The level of military and economic assistance provided during the war continued after 1953, with a tremendous amount of technology being transferred to the PRC. However, the war also caused the beginning of cracks in the alliance. The Chinese had fought the war largely on their own and were disappointed by the limited military involvement of the Soviet Union. The Soviet demand that China pay for all of the military equipment provided was particularly galling. More fundamentally, by the late 1950s, Mao found deep Soviet involvement in Chinese economic development and military affairs to be curtailing the PRC’s independence. By the mid-1960s, these cracks would widen and the Sino-Soviet Alliance would break apart.
朝鲜战争也影响了中国与苏联的关系。从短期来看,与美国的战斗加强了中苏联盟。战争期间提供的军事和经济援助水平持续到1953年以后,大量技术被转让给中国。然而,战争也导致了联盟的破裂。中国人在很大程度上是独立作战的,对苏联有限的军事介入感到失望。苏联要求中国支付所有提供的军事装备尤其令人恼火。更根本的是,到了20世纪50年代末,毛泽东发现苏联对中国经济发展和军事事务的深度介入削弱了中国的独立。到20世纪60年代中期,这些裂缝将会扩大,中苏联盟将会解体。

Finally, the Korean War symbolizes the superpower competition of the Cold War. It was the only occasion in the Cold War when the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States – plus the other Western powers – were regularly in direct combat with one another. Later in the Cold War, the superpowers only fought each other’s proxies or client states. But in Korea, Soviet fighter pilots engaged in dogfights with American pilots, and Chinese infantry grappled with American infantry. Hundreds of thousands of men were taken prisoner, injured, or killed. Some of the most modern new weapons were utilized and the best generals of the three countries planned operations for the war. Historian William Stueck has gone so far as to describe it as a substitute for a Third World War. In any event, the Korean War brought the superpowers to the brink of world war. Less dramatically, the Korean War was the point where the differences between Communism and democracy, the Soviet Union and the USA, actually warranted major conventional warfare. The fact that the Korean War was a conflagration of this magnitude and intensity is sufficient reason that it should not be forgotten.
最后,朝鲜战争象征着冷战时期的超级大国竞争。这是冷战中唯一一次苏联、中华人民共和国和美国的武装力量——以及其他西方大国——定期进行直接战斗。冷战后期,超级大国只与对方的代理人或客户国家作战。但是在韩国,苏联战斗机飞行员与美国飞行员进行格斗,中国步兵与美国步兵格斗。成千上万的人被俘虏、受伤或杀害。使用了一些最现代的新武器,三个国家中最优秀的将军为战争计划了行动。历史学家威廉·斯图克甚至把它描述为第三次世界大战的替代品。无论如何,朝鲜战争把超级大国带到了世界大战的边缘。不太引人注目的是,朝鲜战争是共产主义和民主、苏联和美国之间的差异实际上证明了主要常规战争的关键。朝鲜战争是如此规模和强度的一场大火,这一事实足以成为不应被忘记的理由。

原文:
The Significance of the Korean War in the History of Warfare
The Significance of the Korean War in the History of Warfare

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